Cybersecurity Cost of Quality: Managing the Costs of Cybersecurity Risk
  Management by Radziwill, Nicole M. & Benton, Morgan C.
Cybersecurity Cost of Quality: Managing the Costs of 
Cybersecurity Risk Management 
 
Nicole Radziwill and Morgan Benton 
 
Abstract 
There is no standard yet for measuring and controlling the costs associated with implementing              
cybersecurity programs. To advance research and practice towards this end, we develop a             
mapping using the well-known concept of quality costs and the Framework Core within the              
Cybersecurity Framework produced by the National Institute of Standards and Technology           
(NIST) in response to the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014. This mapping can be easily               
adopted by organizations that are already using the NIST CSF for cybersecurity risk             
management to plan, manage, and continually improve cybersecurity operations. If an           
organization is not using the NIST CSF, this mapping may still be useful for linking elements in                 
accounting systems that are associated with cybersecurity operations and risk management to a             
quality cost model. 
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Introduction 
In 1995, The American Society for Quality (ASQ) presented an article in its flagship publication               
Quality Progress about “cyberquality” - defined as ​information about quality you can find on              
the internet​. Because technology has progressed by orders of magnitude over the past two              
decades, this use of the term now seems overly simplistic! There is a new “cyberquality” which is                 
readily apparent in the ISO 9001 definition of quality: “the totality of characteristics of an entity                
that bear upon its ability to satisfy stated and implied needs.” If that entity is a networked,                 
connected device or system, then the stated and implied needs of customers and other              
stakeholders cannot be met without cybersecurity.  
 
With the growth and evolution of the Internet of Things (IoT), people, vehicles, homes, city               
infrastructures, and industrial infrastructures are becoming more tightly interconnected,         
requiring new strategies for designing quality into systems. (Radziwill & Benton, 2017) At the              
same time, we will need more robust metrics for controlling and continuously reducing the costs               
associated with both quality assurance and cybersecurity risk management. Cyberquality will           
become the net effect of simultaneously meeting quality goals and cybersecurity goals, so it              
makes sense to explore cost metrics that are linked to both domains. 
 
As the number of networked components increases, so does the potential for catastrophic             
impact. Over the last several years, reports of software deployed over the Internet designed to               
destroy infrastructure have increased - and infrastructure impacts all organizations. Such “cyber            
attacks” typically occur when software is deployed, usually (but not always) via a network, onto               
other systems - with the intent of destroying physical or information assets. These attacks occur               
via a number of attack vectors, and not all are technological: systems can also be breached                
maliciously or accidentally by insiders, and “social engineering” can be used to trick trusted              
users into giving up their passwords or answers to security questions. With nearly 26 million IoT                
endpoints expected by the year 2019, the pace and intensity of intrusions will increase.              
(Trautman & Ormerod, 2017) 
 
Because “repeated cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure [demonstrated] the need,” in           
2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 13636 (EO 13636) directing the National            
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) to create a “framework to reduce cyber risks to               
critical infrastructure” (Obama, 2013, p. 11739). In the context of this order, “critical             
infrastructure” refers to: 
 
“… systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States              
that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a             
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public         
health or safety, or any combination of those matters​.” (Obama, 2013, p. 11739) 
 
This paper explores the intersection of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and quality             
cost models, with the goal of making it easier for organizations to study, monitor, and control                
the costs associated with cybersecurity. Although the NIST CSF was intended to support the              
critical infrastructure systems that most production systems rely on, it is broadly applicable for              
cybersecurity risk management at organizations of all sizes. 
 
 
Background 
There are four topics that inform the mapping that serves as the primary contribution of this                
article. They are: cybersecurity economics, the NIST CSF, the concept of quality costs, and              
models that describe how quality costs are typically distributed in organizations. These topics             
are covered in order in the following sections. 
 
Cybersecurity Economics 
Protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility of information takes time, effort, and            
money. Research on the costs of cybersecurity date back nearly two decades, mostly focused on               
two themes: budgeting appropriately, and determining the economic impacts of cyber attacks.            
For example, Campbell et al. (2003) examined the economic implications of cybersecurity            
breaches using stock market performance as an indicator. By creating models that estimated the              
stock valuation in the absence of an attack, and comparing them to stock performance after               
attacks, they found detectable dips in stock price only following attacks that involved             
unauthorized access to confidential data. Attacks that did not appear to have direct impact on               
the customer were not associated with this same pattern. 
 
Böhme (2010) performed a comprehensive review of the literature to examine relationships            
between the costs of information security and benefits realized from making those expenditures.             
This author recognized that there is a baseline level of security provided by preventive efforts for                
risk mitigation, along with testing those elements. At some point, the costs level out, so that to                 
provide robust mitigation of external breaches, it would cost much more than many             
organizations are willing to invest. There is “art and science” associated with identifying the              
ideal balance, so the author recommends using ​Return on Security Investment (ROSI)​, which is              
the benefits less the costs, divided by the costs, and converted into a percentage. 
 
Figure 1.​ Cost/benefit relationships in information security. From Böhme (2010). 
 
Brecht & Nowey (2013) reviewed all techniques that had been applied to assessing costs of               
information security, and categorized them into four areas: cost/benefit analysis of           
cybersecurity (including research on optimal investment), cost of cybercrime, surveys          
summarizing the actual costs of cybersecurity management, and quality cost models. The            
category on quality cost models was the only one that did not cite research directly related to the                  
domain of information security, but rather seemed to suggest that applying quality cost models              
would be a logical next step. They suggest that effective cost models in cybersecurity will address                
the costs of purchasing, operating, implementing, and depreciating tools and systems; costs of             
operating those tools and systems; costs of consulting or other labor; and cost of risk or                
uncertainty.  
 
Gordon et al. (2011) examined the impact of cyber attacks on stock returns, and found that when                 
grouped according to the three tenets of information security (confidentiality, integrity, and            
availability), breaches that impacted availability have the greatest negative effects. Gordon et al.             
(2015) extended the Gordon-Loeb (GL) Model for determining the optimal level of investment in              
cyber security activities to account for externalities such as botnets (global networks of infected              
computers that can be used to launch denial of service attacks, or compromised individuals that               
engage in psychological warfare on behalf of a nation-state, terrorist, or activist group). With              
externalities considered, they found that most organizations underinvest in cybersecurity          
operations, and affirm that “governments around the world are justified in considering            
regulations and/or incentives designed to increase cyber security investments by private sector            
firms.” 
 
Moore et al. (2016) interviewed 40 executives with primary responsibility for cybersecurity,            
selected from Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) and Chief Information Officers (CIOs)            
drawn mainly from healthcare, financial, retail, and government. 31 of the respondents were             
from the US, and 9 were international. The questions, which were exploratory in nature, focused               
on how threats were identified, prioritized, and managed, and the decision-making process for             
cybersecurity investments at the respondents’ organizations. They noticed few differences          
between the industry sectors, and remarked that finding qualified cybersecurity professionals           
seemed, in general, to be much more challenging that finding funding to support cybersecurity.  
 
These authors also drew a conclusion that is directly relevant to the need for the present study.                 
They report that in practice, “there is much less focus on the actual results of cybersecurity                
efforts, such as examining costs and the effectiveness of controls. This may be due to the                
widespread use of frameworks [such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework] which promote the             
use of process measures.” A mechanism for examining costs that is aligned with a process-based               
framework thus may have rather broad applicability. 
 
 
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 further clarified the intent of EO 13636, directing              
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to “facilitate and support the             
development of a voluntary, consensus-based, industry-led set of standards, guidelines, best           
practices, methodologies, procedures, and processes to cost-effectively reduce cyber risks to           
critical infrastructure.” (S.1353, 2014) Responding to this charge, NIST published three           
requests for information (RFI) to learn how organizations were managing cybersecurity risk,            
and to identify best practices. NIST published its first version of the CSF, which captured and                
organized the results, in February 2014. 
 
The NIST CSF provides proactive risk-based guidance and a common, technology-neutral           
language for cybersecurity management. It complements an organization’s cybersecurity         
operations, can be used to launch a cybersecurity program where none exists, and can be used in                 
conjunction with other standards and guidance, including ISO 31000 (Risk Management), the            
ISO/IEC 27000 series (Information Security Management Systems), and NIST Special          
Publication (SP) 800-39 (Managing Information Security Risk). Although designed with the           
protection of critical infrastructure (power generation, water/wastewater management,        
transportation systems) in mind, it can be applied to manage cybersecurity risk in any              
environment. The framework is voluntary, not prescriptive, and can be used with many different              
risk management tools, techniques, and practices. 
 
NIST CSF is a toolkit of 98 “pointers” to guidance provided by five standards or collections of                 
best practices. The pointers, called “subcategories,” are classified into five functions: ​Identify​,            
Protect​, ​Detect​, ​Respond​, and ​Recover​. The five functions are further broken down by tasks              
in cybersecurity risk management, which are referred to as categories. The table of functions,              
categories, subcategories, and informative references is called the Framework Core. 
 
Figure 2 shows how the Framework Core begins. The first category, “Asset Management,”             
contains 6 of the 98 total subcategories (“pointers” to the standards and guidance in the far right                 
column). Each subcategory represents an objective, task, or group of tasks that must be              
performed to advance cybersecurity risk management. For example, ID.AM-1 is “Physical           
devices and systems within the organization are inventoried.” This specifies ​what ​must be done,              
not ​how ​it should be done. The “Informative References” column on the far provide directs the                
NIST CSF user to applicable areas of standards and guidance that could be considered as the                
organization is deciding ​how​ to inventory devices and systems. 
 
 
Figure 2.​ The first category (Asset Management) in the Framework Core. (NIST, 2014b) 
 
There are five standards/guidance that are leveraged by the NIST CSF. Together, they provide a               
comprehensive platform for unified cybersecurity operations, risk management, and strategic          
management. These are: 
● Center for Cybersecurity Top 20 Critical Security Controls (CCS CSC) - a            
standard for computer security that outlines 20 key actions that can be taken to block or                
mitigate the effects of known attacks. (CIS, 2016) The 20 controls have been mapped to               
the five NIST CSF functions. (SANS, 2016) 
● COBIT 5 (ISACA, 2012) - a business framework for management and governance of             
information security. Used to translate business and customer-focused needs into          
actionable operations objectives. 
● ISA/IEC 62443-2-1:2009/ISA 62443-3-3:2013 (ISA/IEC, 2013) - standards       
specifically for the security of industrial control systems, formerly known as ISA99. 
● ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (ISO/IEC, 2016) - standards describing best practices for the           
management of information security, and also providing a path towards compliance with            
HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Payment Card Industry (PCI) regulations. 
● NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Rev. 4 (NIST, 2013) - security controls and             
assessment procedures organized into 18 groups, each with its own specific function (e.g.             
access control, contingency planning, incident response) 
 
An alternative view of the Framework Core is also available. (NIST, 2014c) Shown in Figure 3,                
this mapping provides the same information as in the Framework Core, but no descriptions are               
provided and there is a separate column for each reference. This supplement is useful for               
organizations that already have institutional capabilities aligned with one or more of the             
references, and do not plan to consult every one. The coverage of subcategories is also more                
clear in the alternative mapping of the Framework Core than it is in NIST (2014b). 
 
 
Figure 3.​ Alternative mapping of the Framework Core. (NIST, 2014c) 
 
 
The NIST CSF links strategic planning, quality management, risk management (e.g. using ISO             
31000), and cybersecurity operations. Because it fills the gap between cybersecurity operations            
and the quality/risk planning efforts that are usually only done at the executive and business               
process levels, it plays a central role in other tools and frameworks. This includes the Baldrige                
Cybersecurity Excellence Builder (BCEB), and the widely-applied Cybersecurity Capability         
Maturity Model (C2M2) family for domain-specific assessment and continuous improvement of           
cybersecurity risk management. C2M2 guidance covers electric power generation and          
distribution, oil/natural gas, and dams. (Miron & Muita, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 4. NIST CSF complements cybersecurity operations, risk management, and quality           
management. [Adapted from Fig. 2 in NIST (2014).] 
 
 
Quality Cost Models 
Quality is often promoted as a key element for achieving and maintaining competitiveness, and              
cost of quality metrics can be used to facilitate quality improvements that translate into cost               
reductions. (Campanella, 1999a) This concept has been applied to manufacturing tangible           
products, software-intensive products and systems, and components in the Internet of Things            
(IoT), and can be applied in both development and operations contexts. (Radziwill, 2006)  
 
There are many variations on quality cost models (sometimes referred to as “cost of poor               
quality”) in the literature. All models address the cost of conforming to requirements, and the               
cost of failing to conform to those requirements; some even include opportunity costs (the costs               
associated with not taking a certain action). (Schiffauerova & Thomson, 2006) The most             
commonly used models establish that the ​cost of conformance is the sum of the cost to ​prevent                 
issues and the cost to ​test ​them (appraisal); the ​cost of nonconformance​, also sometimes called               
cost of rework​, is the ​cost of internal failures added to the ​cost of external failures - those                  
problems that are recognized, or directly experienced by, customers and other stakeholders.            
Internal and external failures are distinguished based on ​who is impacted. In many papers,              
these are referred to as Prevention-Appraisal-Failure (PAF) models. To summarize: 
 
Cost of Quality (CoQ) = Cost of Conformance + Cost of Nonconformance 
 
Cost of Conformance = Cost of Prevention + Cost of Appraisal 
 
Cost of Nonconformance = Cost of Internal Failures + Cost of External Failures 
 
Cost of Quality = Cost of Prevention + Cost of Appraisal + Cost of Internal Failures + Cost of 
External Failures 
 
 
Thomas (2009) proposed a “cost of security” model based on the Loss Distribution Approach              
(LDA) that mentions costs of quality, but does not build on its models. Brecht & Nowey (2013)                 
and Böhme (2010), in their studies of costs in information security, both identified that quality               
cost models may be appropriate for cybersecurity. Böhme (2010), however, did not mention             
quality costs directly, but identified the quality cost categories in his articulation of cost/benefit              
relationships in information security. In Figure 5, “protection measures” are prevention,           
“qualitative evaluation” and “penetration testing” are appraisal, “incident counts” could be           
categorized by whether the incidents had internal or external impact, and “direct loss” refers to               
external failures. 
 
Figure 5. Quality costs within cost/benefit relationships in information security. Adapted from            
Böhme (2010). 
 
 
Although similar to the production of tangible products in many ways, the development of              
software is an economically unique activity. Table 1 identifies some of the differences.             
Cybersecurity shares many of the same characteristics as software-intensive production: in           
particular, specifications change extremely rapidly, and defects are related to human           
understanding of the current state of threats, vulnerabilities, and capabilities.  
 
Product Manufacturing Software-Intensive Production 
Physical product Intellectual product 
Output is subject to physical laws and constraints Output is subject to human constraints and logical 
constraints 
Specification is stable Specification is constantly changing 
Product defects more often the result of faulty 
materials, machines, or inspection 
Product defects more often the result of human 
mistakes and misunderstandings, or not 
anticipating ways in which product will be used 
Effectively executing processes to satisfy 
requirements is key 
Understanding requirements is key 
Marginal cost associated with producing more units 
of a product 
No marginal cost for producing additional product 
Table 1.​ Differences between product manufacturing and software-intensive production. 
 
Because of these similarities, and also because so many security controls revolve around             
software or the software development lifecycle (e.g. CCS CSC 2) the PAF model for quality costs                
can be extended to include development activities. In the context of cybersecurity operations,             
the assumption is made that any of the items that contribute to cost of quality also contribute to                  
cost of cybersecurity. As a result, an executive-level dashboard might show two values for cost of                
quality: one specific to activities that enhance cybersecurity, and one for other quality-related             
costs that are not specific to cybersecurity.  
 
Figure 6 shows how costs of quality are related to total development costs. If an organization                
measures cybersecurity cost of quality (CCoQ) in addition to ordinary cost of quality, there will               
be an additional branch off total development costs. Even though there is only one block in                
Figure 6 that expressly calls out cost of labor, it is likely that many of the blocks will be                   
dominated by labor costs because of the unique economic aspects of developing            
software-intensive systems discussed earlier. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.​ Quality costs applied to software development. (From Radziwill, 2006) 
 
 
Quality Costs in Practice 
This model provides great flexibility for organizations that want to examine opportunities for             
improving resource utilization from several perspectives at once: 
 
Total Development Costs = Cybersecurity Cost of Quality (CCoQ) +  
Cost of Quality (CoQ) + Cost of Development 
 
There are many different ways to use this data. Total development costs, or any of its three                 
components, can be tracked longitudinally on a monthly or quarterly basis. Only cybersecurity             
cost of quality can be tracked, and this can still add value. Total cost of quality, ordinary cost of                   
quality, and/or cybersecurity cost of quality can be expressed as a percentage of total              
development costs  and tracked over time.  
 
For best results, however, data should be collected at the lowest levels of the hierarchy               
(appraisal, prevention, internal failures, and external failures in cost of quality; cost of labor,              
cost of materials and contracts in cost of development). With data organized this way, any of the                 
intermediary categories can also be tracked (e.g. cost of nonconformance vs. cost of             
conformance, or cost of rework). Important patterns that will help managers facilitate            
improvements to cybersecurity programs can be found in any of these elements, and so some               
experimentation will be required. 
 
Examples of cybersecurity-related activities that fall into each of the quality cost categories is              
shown in Table 2. The example activities were drawn from the Center for Internet Security’s Top                
20 Critical Security Controls, which provides guidance in the NIST CSF. This list is meant to be                 
illustrative, not exhaustive. 
 
Quality Cost Category Cybersecurity Activities​ (Selected from CIS, 2013) 
Prevention CSC 1: Inventory of authorized and unauthorized devices 
CSC 2: Inventory of authorized and unauthorized software 
CSC 3: Secure configurations for Hardware and software 
CSC 5: Control use of administrative privileges 
CSC 7: Email & web browser protections 
CSC 8: Malware defenses 
CSC 9: Limit & control ports, protocols, services 
CSC 11: Secure configurations for network devices 
CSC 12: Boundary defense 
CSC 13: Data protection 
CSC 14: Controlled access based on need-to-know 
CSC 15: Wireless access control 
CSC 16: Account control & monitoring 
CSC 18: Application software security 
Appraisal CSC 3: Test secure configurations for hardware and software 
CSC 4: Continuous vulnerability assessment & remediation 
CSC 5: Test use of administrative privileges 
CSC 6: Maintenance & monitoring of audit logs 
CSC 7: Test email & web browser protections 
CSC 8: Test malware defenses 
CSC 9: Test limiting of ports, protocols, services 
CSC 10: Test data recovery  
CSC 11: Test secure configurations for network devices 
CSC 12: Test boundary defense 
CSC 13: Test data protection 
CSC 15: Test wireless access control 
CSC 17: Security skills assessment 
CSC 18: Test application software security 
CSC 20: Penetration tests & red team exercises 
Internal Failures CSC 4: Continuous vulnerability assessment & remediation - respond to 
internal breaches and notifications from agencies that monitor vulnerabilities 
CSC 5: Respond to internal misuse of administrative privileges 
CSC 10: Respond to internal data recovery issues 
CSC 12: Respond to internal boundary defense issues 
CSC 15: Respond to internal issues that result from wireless access control 
CSC 19: Internal incident response 
External Failures CSC 4: Continuous vulnerability assessment & remediation - respond to 
external breaches 
CSC 10: Respond to data recovery issues due to external breaches 
CSC 19: External incident response 
Table 2.​ Examples of cybersecurity activities in quality cost categories. 
 
 
Quality Costs and Organizational Maturity 
There has been little work relating the relative levels of quality costs in each category to                
organizational maturity, and no work to date relating cybersecurity costs of quality to the              
maturity of an organization’s cybersecurity risk management. Several very limited papers exist            
that show patterns in quality costs for one organization, but these are of limited value because                
generalizability is low. Of the two models that do exist in the literature (Knox, 1993; Sower et al.,                  
2007), both indicate nearly the same results: that as an organization matures, total quality costs               
decrease, but cost of prevention increases to make this possible.  
 
This is illustrated in Figure 7 from the paper by Knox (1993), who explored quality costs in                 
relation to the maturity of software development processes only. Both appraisal costs and             
prevention costs follow a similar pattern as well: they peak when an organization has systematic,               
repeatable processes and regular, effective training, but then decrease as feedback from learning             
and integration becomes stronger. 
  
 
Figure 7. Quality costs classified by organizational maturity (CMM 1=low, CMM 5=high). From             
Knox (1993) 
 
The value of cybersecurity cost of quality will increase as studies are performed to link measured                
costs from organizations in different industries to maturity levels. Most likely, this maturity             
would be assessed using tools like the three levels of the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity              
Model (C2M2) or the implementation tiers of the Baldrige Cybersecurity Excellence Builder            
(BCEB), both of which are designed to work well with the NIST CSF. Because the BCEB was not                  
specifically designed to assess maturity, newly proposed structures may be required.           
(Almuhammadi & Alsaleh, 2017) 
 
Mapping of NIST CSF to Quality Costs 
The primary contribution of this paper is a mapping of the 98 subcategories in the NIST                
Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) to the four main quality cost categories. By categorizing the             
elements of the NIST CSF at this level, organizations that use the CSF or a similar model can                  
more easily adopt quality costs as a metric. 
 
Methodology 
The mapping was produced using a consensus process with two observers (the authors).             
Independently, each observer classified the 98 NIST CSF subcategories into the four quality cost              
categories. Multiple classifications were allowed. To distinguish appraisal activities from          
prevention in the NIST CSF, keywords like “audit,” “assess,” and “verify” were used. To              
distinguish between appraisal and failures, the likelihood of the appraisal to be ordinary (that is,               
to ​not detect a failure) was considered. To distinguish between internal failures and external              
failures, the likelihood of information about a breach reaching a non-insider audience was             
considered. 
 
Interrater reliability was assessed using Cohen’s kappa, with the guideline outlined by Landis             
and Koch (1977), where the strength of the kappa coefficients =0.01-0.20 slight; 0.21-0.40 fair;              
0.41-0.60 moderate; 0.61-0.80 substantial; 0.81-1.00 almost perfect. Because there were so           
many subcategories in the NIST CSF that map to both internal and external failures, a fifth                
category was added for the kappa calculation to reflect this combination. For elements in which               
one rater marked one quality cost category, and the other rater marked that category plus an                
additional category, one agreement mark was given for the category in agreement, and one              
disagreement mark to reflect the disagreement. As a result, 106 ratings were used to compute a                
kappa of 0.64, indicating substantial agreement. Of the five categories that were assessed for              
agreement, the strongest agreements were in prevention and the elements that combined            
internal failures and external failures. The least agreement was for classifications into the             
internal failures category. 
 
Although a kappa of 0.64 suggests substantial agreement, the next step involved discussing             
classifications where there was disagreement to determine how a consensus recommendation           
could be achieved. There were 23 elements that required consensus determination; 7 were             
resolved easily, and 16 required more extensive discussion. The final mapping is shown in Table               
3 with annotations. The analysis indicates that greater resolution is needed in the accounting              
system to accommodate for quality costs associated with several of the NIST CSF subcategories,              
including: 
 
● PR.IP-4: Backups of information are conducted, maintained, and tested periodically:          
Conducting backups (Prevention) should be accounted for separately from testing          
backup processes (Appraisal) to see if they are functioning as anticipated. 
● PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed         
in accordance with policy: Auditing and verification (Appraisal) should be tracked           
separately from developing processes for logs (Prevention). 
● RS.RP-1, RS.CO-2 through RS.CO-5, RS.AN-3, RS.AM-4, RS.MI-1 and        
RS.MI-2 need to be accounted for by organizations in more detail, depending upon             
whether the work was associated with an internal or external failure.  
● RS.MI-3: Newly identified vulnerabilities are mitigated or documented as accepted          
risks. This item is complex, encompasses many activities, and may even need to be              
revisited in the next update of the NIST CSF. When newly identified vulnerabilities are              
identified, that is an appraisal activity, but when steps are taken to prevent breaches              
before they occur, that is prevention. Furthermore, the identification of the vulnerability            
may take place in the context of responding to an internal failure or an external failure. 
 
In addition, care should be taken when charging any activities to the subcategories in the Detect                
(DE) function. Detection occurs prior to the determination of a breach, and does not depend               
upon the audience that is impacted by that breach. Costs associated with the outcomes of these                
detections should be accounted for by subcategories in the Respond (RS) and Recover (RC)              
functions. 
 
[INCLUDE SPREADSHEET on “FINAL MAPPING” tab AT 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1t6_1DLJHJqzA7zB7DM1GYEo7I
Mm_JVi4zfg-aQJbF7A/edit?usp=sharing​  AS TABLE 3]  
Table 3. ​Mapping of the NIST CSF to the four quality cost categories. 
 
 
 
Application 
Using the mapping in Table 3, any work accounting system (such as an organizational Work               
Breakdown Structure or WBS) that is aligned with the NIST CSF can be adjusted to easily report                 
cybersecurity cost of quality. The only change that may be required is to split some elements of                 
the NIST CSF into two so that the appropriate quality cost categories can be assessed.               
Alternatively, if this is not feasible, an organization can create one category called “rework” in               
which all costs related to recovery from internal and external failures are grouped. Cost of               
rework may be just as useful a metric, particularly for organizations where a process approach               
and cybersecurity risk management are not as mature. 
 
The organization can present this data as bar charts or Pareto charts, or can track the evolution                 
of these values over time on segmented bar charts or in time series. Trends should be examined                 
and discussed by staff and those with decision-making authority to identify opportunities for             
improvement. All values should be considered with respect to the maturity of the organization,              
in terms of quality management, risk management, and cybersecurity management. Most           
importantly, all organizations will require a period of adjustment and calibration when adopting             
a quality cost approach to help continually improve cybersecurity. 
 
 
Discussion & Conclusions 
This article presented a mapping of the 98 subcategories in the Framework Core of the NIST                
Cybersecurity Framework to the four categories of quality costs (prevention, appraisal, internal            
failure, and external failure). The value of reporting costs of cybersecurity in terms of quality               
costs lies less in the levels themselves, and more in how the values relate to one another, change                  
over time, and change in response to changes in strategy, organization, or cybersecurity             
investments. The primary limitation of this study is that the practical applicability of the model               
can only be assessed through future work on a broad scale: implementation at different              
organizations, case studies, and empirical research. 
 
Based on this exercise, it became apparent that the NIST CSF does not distinguish between               
internal and external failures, and this is critical for managing the costs of cybersecurity - unless                
an organization chooses a simpler quality cost model, and groups internal and external failures              
to track cost of rework. Furthermore, there are a few subcategories in the NIST CSF that should                 
be segmented in work accounting systems to reflect whether those tasks are being performed as               
preventive measures, or to test and appraise preventive measures. Organizations may also wish             
to customize the mapping to better align with their unique systems, structures, and work              
processes. 
 
Using cybersecurity cost of quality, organizations can answer questions like: 
● Is there enough emphasis on prevention?​ Typically, unless an organization’s 
process maturity is high, this category will be associated with the greatest costs. If costs 
of prevention do not occupy the greatest proportion of quality costs, and  
● Is there too much or too little time being spent on appraisal (testing)?​ If too 
little time is spent on appraisal activities, the cost of rework will be high. An excessively 
low cost of rework coupled with a high cost of conformance suggests that too much time 
is being spent on appraisal. 
● Is testing aggressive enough that it is triggering internal failures, or is the 
cost of internal failures small or nonexistent?​ This is an indication that appraisal 
efforts should be made more rigorous. 
 
Key questions to be answered in future research include: 
● What are the theoretical and empirical relationships between the amount spent on 
quality cost categories (Prevention Appraisal, Internal Failure, External Failure) and the 
amounts spent on each function in the Framework Core (Identify, Protect, Detect, 
Respond, Recover)? 
● Does the distribution of cybersecurity costs of quality change in a systematic way as an 
organization’s cybersecurity risk management system matures? 
● Does the distribution of cybersecurity costs of quality change in a systematic way as an 
organization’s software lifecycle management matures? 
● Do the costs of external failures increase proportionally as the attack surface expands? 
● Are the costs of external failures similar for all organizations? Live benchmarking could 
help organizations identify whether they are being targeted for attacks. 
 
Cost of quality is a time-tested and well documented model for identifying and assessing              
opportunities for improvement that will result in cost savings. By extending this model to              
cybersecurity risk management using a framework that is well known and widely applied, future              
empirical research that can provide cost benchmarks and additional methods for anomaly            
detection is enabled. 
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